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BOOK REVIEWS
THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT. By
George J. Alexander and Travis H. D. Lewin. Syracuse University:
1972.
Dean Alexander's and Professor Lewin's work, The Aged and
the Need for Surrogate Management, examines our institutional
responses to the problems confronting the elder citizen. The book
stems from a study of more than 500 recent cases involving prob-
lems of the aged taken from New York State's Tompkins and Onon-
daga counties. Using the cases as a foundation, the authors struc-
ture a thorough discussion of the socio-legal problems which arise
from guardian-conservatorship.
Presently, 21 million Americans are over 65 years old, and it
is anticipated that there will be 30 million by 1990. These citizens
are afflicted with maladies unique to their age group including
slowing memories, failing judgment and designing heirs. These
problems give rise to a need for guidance and advice concerning the
individual's property and personal well-being. The authors reveal
our legal process's inability to respond on a uniformly high standard
to these important problems. They note that our institutional treat-
ment of the aged affects all economic classes. Additionally, we are
told that "[b]y looking to the disposition of the aged's property, we
can gain insight into society's general attitudes toward the other
problems facing the elderly."'
The research which buttresses the text's conclusions is compre-
hensive and well conceived. In 1968, while professors at Syracuse
University Law School, the authors sought to ascertain whether the
goals of our states' incompetency statutes were being achieved.
They chose the New York Incompetency Act2 as an archetype of
national legislation in this area, and they selected Tompkins and
Onondaga counties as representative demographic examples of the
nation's population. I am persuaded that the text supports the
authors' choice of these study samples as national norms, and that
the extensive analysis of ten years of surrogate court files reveals
1. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE
MANAGEMENT iii (1972).
2. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 100 et seq. (McKinney 1971).613
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the ineffectiveness not only of New York's act, but also of her
sister statesA
The writers are greatly concerned with the judicial proceedings
which determine a citizen's "functional competence." Noting that
the ultimate implications of these surrogate management and com-
petency proceedings to the elderly defendant are potential loss of
self-determination and deprivation of property rights, the authors
scrutinize the present system. We are asked to consider whether ajudge can make an accurate determination based mainly on the
testimony of the petitioner, usually a potential heir, and on that of
an expert witness, a doctor paid for by the petitioner.
The authors also discuss the administration of public institu-
tions provided for the aged. We are told of the state's efforts to
acquire and husband its institutional guests' assets. This process isjustified on two grounds: one, the state argues that it must recoup
a portion of the cost of maintaining the institution to assuage the
general taxpayer; and two, public policy claims it is protecting the
aged citizen's property from society's mendacious clutches. How-
ever, the authors point out that the citizen is not compensated for
the loss of his resources with good health care and well-managed
institutions.
Another area the text investigates concerns surrogate manage-
ment where the citizen is not institutionalized. This situation calls
for a judgment on the degree of extra-institutional supervision
needed to protect the elder person. The authors propose statutes
which will empower the courts to tailor individual programs for
each patient in order to minimize his segregation from society. In
their model statute the writers create a flexible posture for the
surrogate which allows him a range of power from mere advice to
complete control over the property. We are told that this form of
adaptible system has been used effectively by the Social Security
Administration with their "representative payee" program.' The
"payee," a close friend or relative, receives the eligible citizen's
monthly social security check and pays for his rent, food and other
expenses. The Veterans Administration has implemented a similar
plan.' The authors believe that such systems have the advantages
of minimizing management expenses and maximizing the afflicted
citizen's civil rights.
My forty years of practice compell me to criticize the book's
depiction of an heir's character. I feel that the authors' use of the
3. 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1966). This annotation reviews pertinent state statutes
relating to incompetency and guardianship.
4. For the text of applicable statutes see 42 U.S.C. § 405(J) (1971), 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1601-404.1610 (1972).
5. 38 C.F.R. § 13.59 (1972).
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phrase "laughing heir,", and their editing of case samples leaves an
impression that all heirs are motivated solely by selfish interests.
In my experience the petitioner's prime concern is the constructive
management of the incompetent's funds. Additionally, a perspica-
cious disposition of the funds protects the petitioner from a personal
expenditure for his relative's unpaid bills at a later date.
In conclusion, Dean Alexander and Professor Lewin deserve
praise for their excellent study. Throughout, the book retains
perspective, balancing retrospective and prospective examination
of the problems of surrogate management for the aged. The
authors' selective appendix of present state statutes and model
statutes will provide research sources for the practicing bar and
legislators. Also, students of Family Law investigating the legal
problems of the aged will find this work an invaluable source. I
believe that The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management
furnishes a constructive evaluation of the aged's socio-legal prob-
lems which was heretofore unavailable.
Norman J. Kalcheim*
* Partner, Abrahams & Loewenstein, Philadelphia; Member of Family Law
Section Council A.B.A.; Chairman, Committee on Legal Problems of the Aged,
A.B.A.; Member, Philadelphia Commission on the Aging; Delegate of A.B.A.
to White House Conference on the Aging, 1971.
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PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY. By Bruce Ennis. New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1972. Pp. xix + 232. $6.95.
A generation ago, Huxley's Brave New World and Orwell's
1984 warned of a coming psychological totalitarianism. Within
the last decade, writers like R. D. Laing' and Thomas Szasz 2 have
adduced evidence to show that we are well on the way to a psy-
chiatric dystopia. Bruce Ennis' Prisoners of Psychiatry, an account
of three years spent counselling psychiatric patients for the New
York Civil Liberties Union, adds substantial and substantive sup-
port to this prediction. Other writers on this topic have supported
their arguments with a few specific examples of psychiatric persecu-
tion. Ennis utilizes a case study approach. The cases allow the
reader to see where psychiatric power has broken down our con-
stitutional safeguards, and to see what impact this has had on the
individual at the human level.
This book is shocking, not because Ennis describes those in-
stances of gross psychiatric'malpractice and brutality that any court
of law would condemn, but because he describes destructive and
totalitarian conduct by mental health officials that has the courts'
blessing. Ennis' aim was not to expose instances of inherently un-
lawful behavior that just happened to be associated with psychiatric
patients. Rather, he sought test cases with which to reform the
law. This is the shocker: case after case where mental health offi-
cials and psychiatrists arbitrarily deprive citizens of their liberties,
with the full sanction of the courts.
"MENTALLY ILL"-THE LABEL
Psychiatrists derive their power from their authority to apply
the label "mentally ill" to unwanted members of society. The ap-
plication of this label cancels the indivdual's constitutional rights.
Courts do not deny a person the right to a fair trial because of his
race, politics, or religion; however, they routinely deny a person the
right to a fair trial just because a psychiatrist declares him "mentally
ill." This label functions as a tool whereby a person may be pun-
ished or removed from society without the usual safeguards: pre-
sumptions of innocence, rules of evidence, and all other elements
1. R.D. LAINO, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967); R.D. LAING & A.
ESTERSON, SANITY, MADNESS, AND THE FAMILY (1964).
2. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SzAsz, THE MANU-
FACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
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of due process. Ennis' experiences indicate that when a prosecuting
attorney has insufficient evidence to pursue a criminal case on its
merits and the defendant has some peculiarity or history compatible
with a suspicion of "mental illness," the prosecutor will often try
to get the defendant declared incompetent to stand trial. If the
government psychiatrist finds the defendant "mentally ill," he may
be salted away for life in an institution for the criminally insane,
without trial. Thus an individual's life and liberty is sacrificed to
bureaucratic expediency.'
Ennis cites figures that emphasize the magnitude of the prob-
lem. Our mental hospitals house three quarters of a million
persons. Most are hospitalized against their will; a large propor-
tion are permanently incarcerated. There are one and a half
million admissions per year, most involuntary. For every person
imprisoned in our penal institutions, three are imprisoned in our
mental institutions; very few of the latter have been convicted of
any crime. Fewer than five percent are considered dangerous by
their jailers; the rest are incarcerated because they are odd, unwant-
ed, or annoying. Although the ostensible purpose of these institu-
tions is therapeutic, the majority of those interned are permanently
damaged by hospitalization. Physical and social conditions in
mental hospitals are much worse, as a rule, than those in prisons.
Even if a patient is discharged, the stigma attached to having been
hospitalized is permanently debilitating, perhaps worse than that of
having been a convict.
Apart from the ordinary penal system, then, there is a separate
and considerably larger penal system administered entirely by the
psychiatric establishment. The "crimes" are those of being odd zor
unwanted or having strange or potentially dangerous thoughts. The
punishments are more extreme than in the official penal system,
and instead of policemen, attorneys, judges, and prison wardens
there are mental health officials. The system operates indepen-
dently of the courts and the constitution.
State laws require the pschiatric system to connect with the
judicial system at certain points. Such laws appear to limit the
autonomy of the psychiatric system, but they also define it into
existence. Laws regulating involuntary hospitalization and incom-
petency proceedings allow psychiatrists to abridge personal freedom,
providing they comply with certain formalities. The stringency
psychiatrically contrived myth that there is a thing called "mental
illness": a mysterious cancer in our society which psychiatrists
3. T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 186 et seq. (1963). Dr. Szasz
describes how nearly every right guaranteed in the Constitution is legally violated
once the label "mentally ill" is applied.
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of these regulations varies widely from state to state,' but underlying
these regulations is the unquestioned propriety of giving psychia-
trists the authority to suspend a person's constitutional rights. The
continued high rate of commitments belies the efficacy of these
regulations in protecting the individual.5
The psychiatric system commands such authority and the
idea that psychiatrists could make mistakes or act unethically is
so remote from popular opinion, that the legislation subjecting it
to judicial review has no substantial effect on the system's autono-
my. Incompetency proceedings are, on the whole, formalities
wherein the judge routinely sanctifies the psychiatrist's authority.
In these proceedings judges rarely weigh the evidence and form
their own opinions of the defendant's competence. They are
usually concerned solely with whether one or two psychiatrists say
he is incompetent. Ennis recounts one incident in which hospital
administrators, seeking to attach the savings an inmate had astutely
accumulated, petitioned a court to declare her incompetent to
manage her estate. The petition contained a false attestation that
she had been examined and found incompetent by a psychiatrist.
The judge found her incompetent wholly on the basis of the at-
testation, without ever seeing the inmate involved. In this case, the
law requiring a judge to determine the issue of incompetency was
a meaningless bureaucratic exercise. In another case, a patient
was committed for long term hospitalization. The psychiatrist
supported his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with the defen-
dant's decision to quit smoking in response to the Surgeon General's
Report. The presiding judge did not see fit to dispute this reason-
ing.
BLOCKS TO CHANGE
One might think that in the face of such gross injustices, the
courts, as guardians of our Constitution, would hasten to remedy
the situation. Yet a determined lawyer such as Ennis is steadfastly
opposed by the New York legal and mental health bureaucracies
in trying to get the issue before the courts. Judges repeatedly
4. The states' legislation covering mental patients and commitment is sum-
marized in an excellent handbook recently published by the American Civil
Liberties Union. B. ENNIS & L SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
(1973).
5. The data on California's recently tightened commitment procedures is
to the contrary: California has only 1/5 the state inmate population as loosely
regulated New York has. Yet other jurisdictions with equally stringent commit-
ment requirements continue to have astronomical commitment rates. California's
low rate is probably due to its laudable policy of phasing out state hospitals in
favor of community services. B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY, 223-24
(1972).
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ignore obvious facts and rule in favor of bureaucratic expediency.
Any possible technicality is used to favor the interest of the psy-
chiartic system. When state mental health authorities are clearly
wrong in opposing a mental patient, judges frequently act in such
a way as to avoid setting a new precedent favoring the mental
patient or censuring the state's agent. Usually the judge will warn
the state agency that unless it concedes to the patient, he will enter
judgment against it. The state then backs down, and avoids the
adverse precedent. After a case is dismissed as moot, the state is
free to switch its position again until the case is relitigated. On
the other hand, if the mental patient is likely to lose the case, he
receives no such judicial warning. This practice enables state
mental health authorities to establish and maintain the legal pre-
cedents suporting their autonomy.
WHY ATTACK THE "MENTALLY ILL"?
There is a two-pronged legal attack against those labelled
"mentally ill": 1) the legislatures pass laws creating a separate
psychiatric penal system, and 2) judges construe these laws so as
to restrict mental patients as much as possible and they actively
resist constitutional challenges that would restore the patients'
rights. While we must deplore this state of affairs, it is also
important to understand it. In restricting the "mentally ill," leg-
islators and judges are responding to public opinion both as mem-
bers of that public and as official servants seeking to promote its
welfare. Therefore, to understand why mental patients are denied
the protection of the law, we must consider why society wishes to
suppress them.
An argument frequently made for incarcerating the "mentally
ill" is that they are dangerous. This argument is wholly unsup-
ported by the available evidence. Ennis points out that mental
patients and ex-mental patients are statistically far less likely to
commit crimes, particularly violent crimes, than the average citi-
zen.6 Furthermore, even if there is, arguably, a real danger, should
not such individuals have the same civil rights as known criminals,
particularly recidivists? We do not jail a man for what he might
do in the future. The infringement of human rights in so doing
is far more destructive to society than the risk incurred in allowing
such persons to go free.
The media aggravate the situation by reflecting and confirm-
ing the widespread notion that mental patients are dangerous.
"Psychopathic" killings such as those by the Boston Strangler or
6. Id. at 26-27, 225-27.
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the Zodiac Killer, although exceedingly rare, are the most news-
worthy of items. If an infamous murderer has ever had psychiatric
counselling, the press emphasizes this fact and with 20/20 hindsight
suggests that the dangerousness could have been spotted. Hearing
of such events arouses great fear in the public because it raises the
possibility that anyone might be a killer. Public insecurity is
further increased by the newspapers' practice of stressing the ap-
parent normality of such people before their "insane attack." The
public infers that we must give to the psychiatrists more power to
identify and lock up such people before they have a chance to
run amok.
There is also widespread public support for involuntary
hospitalization of a person who wishes to kill himself. The con-
sensus is that persons who make suicidal attempts or gestures are
really asking for help and really want to be restrained regardless
of what they say to the contrary. But imputed unconscious motiva-
tion is completely unprovable. This notion could justify forcing
a person to donate money to the state just because a state-appointed
psychiatrist testifies that this is what he really wants to do. This
may seem absurd, yet to confiscate a person's money is far less
odious than to incarcerate him because this is what someone, who
happens to be a psychiatrist, decides he "really" wants. This argu-
ment could rationalize the worst kind of totalitarianism, in which
the state decides what everyone "really" wants and regards any
deviation from that standard as "mental illness" requiring com-
pulsory treatment.
A major function of the psychiatric prison system is to re-
lieve society of those problematical persons who disturb others
without breaking any laws. Anyone who has worked as an ad-
mitting psychiatrist realizes that the most common reason people
are involuntarily hospitalized is that friends, neighbors, and family
members wish them to be. Perhaps the patient has for weeks
terrorized his family with continual threats of suicide or kept them
up night after night screaming and thrashing and breaking up the
furniture. Perhaps he is well known to the police for having been
picked up nude in various parts of town in the dead of winter.
This extreme nuisance value is a common reason for involuntary
hospitalization. Here the psychiatrist is called in as a social gar-
bage collector to pick up people who are so difficult that no one
else is willing to cope with them. These people usually have not
broken any laws warranting incarceration, but they often cause
greater suffering to those around them than people who have
broken laws. Even though mental'patients are not more dangerous
than others, they are often destructive of order and tranquility in
their immediate environments. Therefore, it is said to be in the
[Vol. 13
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interest of the greatest good for the greatest number if such people
are put away where they cannot bother anyone except themselves.
Also, there is the myth that hospitalization is therapeutic; it is
easier to hospitalize an unwanted family member or neighbor if
one can maintain the illusion that it is for the person's own good,
rather than a destructive act performed in self-defense. But there
is no good argument for involuntary hospitalization, just as there
is no good argument for waging war, for picking on little kids, or
for wifebeating. Yet one can understand the psychological forces
behind these actions. When a person cannot cope with something,
he tries to get away from it, to put it somewhere else, to scare it
away, to destroy it. When we cannot fix the TV, we kick it or
throw it away. We do this to difficult people by labeling them
"mentally ill." This is the final solution to the mental illness
problem. It was the original rationale for psychiatric prisons, and
it remains the main unspoken rationale for the present psychiatric
prison system.
While the concept of mental illness has been useful as a
justification for social garbage collecting, it has not proved useful
as a therapeutic tool. The term "mental illness" suggests that some
disease process occurs within an individual carrying the label, like
arteriosclerosis or chickenpox. However, biochemical, neurologi-
cal, and physiological theories of mental illness-and there have
been many-have uniformly failed to test out in practice over time.
"Psychopathological" theories, such as Freud's, have failed to
yield therapeutic techniques that can cure the manifestations they
label as "psychotic."
Dr. Szasz has discussed at length how the concept of mental
illness is used to justify scapegoating unpopular individuals. He
points out that societies have always sought scapegoats to account
for their disturbances. In the middle ages, it was the Devil, acting
through the agency of witches; today, it is "mental illness" acting
through the so-called "mentally il." '7 The moral and theological
language of the middle ages is replaced by the quasi-therapeutic
language of modem times,8 in which Oswald and Hitler are not
evil but crazy, and in which war is not mass immorality but mass
"insanity." Since insanity is seen as the cause of socially destruc-
tive behavior, society supports psychiatric persecution of the "in-
sane."
Ennis joins Szasz in concluding that we must throw out the
7. T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); T. SZASZ, THE MANU-
FACTURE OF MADNESS (1970).
8. See the American Psychiatric Association's DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL of mental disorders-the official compendium of all psychiatric
diagnoses-for a description of almost every conceivable type of human behavior.
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can diagnose and cure. This myth provides a justification for
what is a persistent tendency in societies toward persecuting the
unpopular. The road to 1984 begins with persecution of a minority
and ends with persecution of the majority. The concept of mental
illness is inconsistent with a free society, where even the weird,
unwanted, and troublesome must have the full protection of the
laws. If a person commits crimes, he should be prosecuted with
full legal safeguards, but if not, he should be free to pursue what-
ever existence he chooses. I advocate, and believe that Ennis
would agree, that we abolish the problem of mental illness by
abolishing the concept of mental illness.
Frank A. Gerbode, M.D.*
* B.A., Stanford University, 1962; M.D., Yale University, 1968; Dr. Ger-
bode completed his psychiatric training at the Stanford University Medical Center,
1972.
